We study the implications for pricing strategies and product o¤erings of consumers' temptation when the di¤erentiation of the product is horizontal.
shown that product diversity and …rm's pro…ts decrease with the probability of temptation and with the consumers'awareness of their dynamic inconsistency.
(JEL: D11, D42, D82, L11, L12, L15)
Introduction
Consumers' temptation is an important characteristic of the consumer purchasing behavior. Many consumers establish ex-ante that they would like to commit to consuming healthy, low calorie groceries. Nonetheless, ex-post temptation takes place and they modify their choices towards unhealthier alternatives. This behavior re ‡ects the dynamic inconsistency of consumers'preferences commonly known as temptation.
An important implication is that when consumers are aware of their future change in preferences, they are more willing to enter stores which do not carry unhealthy products in order to avoid ex-post choices inconsistent with ex-ante preferences.
To capture this idea, Strotz (1955) and Kreps (1979) introduced a class of preferences that incorporates consumers'temptation. Let M denote the consumers'choice set and U the utility function-the commitment utility function-that he has when making the shopping list. The consumer anticipates that, once inside the store, his utility function will change to V with a positive probability . Let x u denote the consumer's choice with U -his commitment choice-and x v denote his choice with V -his tempting choice. Then, the consumer's expected ex-ante utility is given by
Following Dekel and Lipman (2007) we call these class of preferences as the "random Strotz representation". 1 In this setting a dynamic consistency problem arises because, while the consumer would like to commit ex-ante to choosing x u , with probability , he ends up choosing x v . We can interpret this preference representation as though the consumer had, ex-post, two di¤erent possible selves: a tempted and a committed self.
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Although simpli…ed, this representation is convenient for our purposes as it creates an ex-ante demand for menus that implement commitment. 3 Other authors as Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) considers this consumer representation.
A novel contribution of this paper is that we analyze a monopolist's optimal pricing problem when the product is horizontally di¤erentiated. This allows us to capture temptation as a change in the consumer's ideal product on the Hotelling line.
We consider a continuum of consumer types; each consumer type knows that he has two (possibly distinct) ideal products on a Hotelling line, one when committed and another one when tempted. In the basic model, we assume that all consumer types have the same temptation ideal product, located at one extreme of the Hotelling line, but they di¤er when committed. Continuing from our previous example, this assumption means that while consumers prefer products with di¤erent calories when committed, they are only tempted by high calories product. Later in the paper, as an extension, we shall study several generalizations of this temptation representation.
2 Note that this representation is quite extreme: if an agent falls into temptation he will forget about the commitment preferences and choose according to the temptation preferences only. Later in the paper we will discuss the robustness of our model to di¤erent representations. 3 Some papers have studied other temptation representations. Gul and Pessendorfer (2001) , for instance, consider that consumer's utility from a choice set equals the realized commitment utility minus the linear "self-control costs", i.e., the realized temptation utility minus the maximum value of the temptation utility over the choice set. Fudenberg and Levine (2005) allow for non-linear selfcontrol costs, as they argue that, with this model we can consider self-control as a limited resource such that the "cognitive load" leads to agents falling into temptation more easily. Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini's (2005) representation covers situations in which agents face uncertainty about the "strength of temptation". Finally, under the Chatterjee and Krishna (2006) representation, the agent has two di¤erent selves and temptation is thought of as the choice of a "virtual alternate self" or alter ego, who appears with a positive probability which depends on the choice set. If the temptation probability is not menu-dependent this representation coincides with the one that we use in our model.
In our model, a monopolist sells several products that can di¤er in their location on the Hotelling line and in pricing. Therefore, the …rm's problem is to decide which goods to o¤er on the Hotelling line and charge a price for each one in such a way that expected pro…ts are maximized. Since consumers are aware of the dynamic inconsistency of their preferences, when designing the optimal selling strategy the …rm has to worry about both their incentives to enter the store (ex-ante IR), and their incentives to participate once inside (ex-post IR). Moreover, the …rm must ensure that once inside the store, each consumer chooses the product designed for himself (ex-post IC ).
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Using this model, we can understand the relationship between the consumers' temptation and the …rm's optimal product design. Does temptation increase or decrease product diversity? Do prices increase with temptation? Does it have welfare implications?
In the standard horizontal di¤erentiation model without temptation, the monopolist o¤ers the ideal product of each consumer type. In our model, instead, the …rm faces the following trade-o¤: by positioning products closer to the temptation preferences, it can increase its pro…ts under the temptation state. However, it also decreases the consumers' ex-ante utility, especially for those with a greater distance between their ideal products with commitment and temptation. Therefore, the …rm's optimal menu may exclude products that are too close to the temptation preferences since otherwise these consumers will not derive su¢ cient utility from entering the store.
In equilibrium, two types of consumers coexist: consumers with similar preferences in the two states, who always consume the same product, and consumers with most diverging preferences, who consume di¤erent products in di¤erent states. The size of the two consumer groups, which is given by the degree of product diversity, and the 4 Eliaz and Spiegler (2004) use a model in which consumers and the …rm have to sign a contract before entering the store, thus they work with an ex-ante incentive compatibility constraint. In our model we do not consider the possibility of the ex-ante contract, so consumers must decide, ex-post, which product to choose from among all the available o¤ers in the store's menu.
…rm's pro…ts decrease with the probability of temptation.
In recent years, several authors have explored the implications of consumer temptation on pricing. A paper related to our work is Esteban, Miyagawa and Shum (2006) . Using Gul and Pesendorfer's (2001) preferences and a vertical di¤erentiation environment, they construct a model in which a monopolist chooses the price and quality of the goods it o¤ers the consumer once inside one store. Thus, as in the present paper, they restrict the number of menus to one. As in our model, they …nd that the …rm is not better o¤ when the consumer operates under temptation and that the heterogeneity of the product o¤ered may be bounded as a result. In other related papers, such as Esteban and Miyagawa (2006a) , the …rm can o¤er multiple menus which allow the …rm to earn more pro…ts, while Esteban and Miyagawa (2006b) consider a competitive framework in which each …rm can also choose several menus. Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) study a model in which dynamically inconsistent agents sign a contract with a …rm, using the same random Strotz representation used here.
In contrast with our model, they assume that while the …rm correctly anticipates the consumers inconsistency, consumers incorrectly believe that, with some probability, they are going to take actions in accordance with their "commitment" preferences.
The "non-common priors" assumption is the source of the exploitative contracts that arise in equilibrium. Thus, the monopolist o¤ers a menu which would not be accepted by consumers if they had the same priors as the …rm. In contrast, our model assumes that consumers are perfectly aware of their dynamic inconsistency, i.e., they are "sophisticated" consumers. However, in Section 5, we extend our model to consider "naive" consumers. The main di¤erence with the Eliaz and Spiegler model is that instead of di¤ering in their temptation believes consumers di¤er in their commitment preferences.
There are other papers that study mechanism design for consumers with time inconsistent preferences, however they focus on present-biased preferences with hyperbolic discounting. For instance, O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999b) each period with some probability. Due to a cue, the more the agents consume today, the greater the marginal utility tomorrow. Therefore, consumption is determined by the stock of past consumption in each state of the world. Their results show that the probability of falling into consumption due to a cue (temptation) decreases with the consumers'discount factor, the value of the outside option, and the impact of current consumption on the stock of consumption. Our model is not about environmental cues since in the consumers'representation used here, the temptation probability is an exogenous variable.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. In Section 3, we study two important benchmarks: the time consistent preferences case, i.e., the standard model in which the temptation probability is zero, and the time inconsistent preferences case in which, ex-post, the only possible state is the temptation state.
Section 4 characterizes the monopolist's optimal menu. Section 5 extends the model to cover the case of non-common priors and more general speci…cations of the consumers' preferences. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
The Model
A monopolist can produce and sell several products in one store. Products are horizontally di¤erentiated à la Hotelling on a segment of unit length. An o¤er from the seller is denoted by x and is a pair (q; p), where q 2 [0; 1] represents the product's location and p 2 R + its price. A menu M is a compact subset of o¤ers M R 2 :
denote the set of o¤ers available to the consumer, where
is the outside option which has a price of zero. We assume consumers are perfectly informed about the o¤ers in the menu.
There is a set of consumers, each of them buying at most one product and deciding, ex-ante, whether to enter the monopolist's store. They can also choose to stay outside the store, which we formalize as choosing the outside option N E = ( ; 0).
To model consumers' behavior we use the random Strotz representation based on the "dual-selves" approach of Strotz (1955) and Kreps (1979) . In particular, we consider that, before entering the store, a consumer evaluates his ex-post decisions with his commitment utility function U ( ). However, with a probability , a consumer makes ex-post decisions with his temptation utility function V ( ).
We assume that is the consumer's commitment ideal product on the Hotelling line which is distributed according to a uniform distribution with support [0; 1] : We also assume that v = 0 is the consumers'ideal product when tempted. 5 Therefore, we consider that, when tempted, all consumers have "extreme" preferences. 6 Then, given a typical menu M , the (ex-ante) surplus of a consumer type if he enters the store is:
where
A consumer type enters the store only if his ex-ante utility is positive. We call this condition ex-ante IR. The interpretation is that, once a consumer is inside the store, he will choose with probability (1 ) the best element in the menu with his commitment utility, while with probability he will choose with his temptation utility. From now on we will refer to the former as the commitment state and to the latter as the temptation state.
Given a menu M , we de…ne the assignment function x ( ) = (q ( ) ; p ( )) : [0; 1] ! M that speci…es for each type 2 [0; 1] the o¤er that he is expected to choose.
Therefore, the tempting (resp., commitment) choice is the o¤er that a consumer is expected to choose in the temptation (resp., commitment) state. Note that since consumers have the same ideal product when tempted, their choices under this state must be the same. On the other hand, under commitment, consumers have di¤erent preferences so their choices may di¤er.
We consider the following speci…cation for the commitment and temptation utility functions, respectively:
and normalize
This is the typical utility speci…cation of a horizontal di¤erentiation model, where s 2 R + represents the maximum possible surplus enjoyed by consumers, and t (q; ) represents the transportation cost, which satis…es:
(i) Symmetry: t(q; ) = t( ; q);
(ii) Non negativity: t(q; ) 0;
(iii) Identity of indiscernibles: t(q; ) = 0 i¤ q = ;
and,
Property (i) (iv) are standard properties used in any horizontal di¤erentia-tion model. An important implication of (v), which we use in our analysis, is that jt 1 (q; )j > jt 1 (q; z)j for all z 2 (q; ). Hence, the marginal transportation cost increases in the distance between and q. 7 An example of a transportation cost function which satis…es all properties (i)-(v) is the quadratic function:
For simplicity, we assume the market is fully covered, which, as standard, requires s being su¢ ciently large.
The monopolist' s problem
The monopolist's problem is to design a menu M = fx ( ) ; x v g 2[0;1] which maximizes his pro…ts subject to consumers' participation and incentive compatibility constraints. For simplicity, we assume that the marginal cost of production is equal to zero. Therefore, the monopolist's problem is given by
(1 )
Consumer type will enter the store if W (M ; ) 0. So, when the ex-ante IR constraint is satis…ed, consumers choose from M . 8 The ex-post IR and IC are standard constraints. As usual, ex-post IR says that a consumer is at least as well o¤ purchasing from the menu as choosing the outside option. Finally, ex-post IC says that a consumer of type cannot be better o¤ by pretending to be another type in each state of the world.
The ex-post IR and IC constraints together imply that x ( ) (resp., x v ) is an optimal choice for U ( ; ) (resp., V ( )).
In the following lemma we show that if the ex-ante IR and ex-post U IC constraints are satis…ed, consumers obtain a non-negative ex-post surplus.
Lemma 1 Ex-ante IR and ex-post U IC imply ex-post U IR.
Proof. Ex-post U IC tells us
Since the market is covered, x ( ) 2 M and thus equation (4) implies that for all
where the second inequality follows from ex-ante IR.
8 Thus, it is assumed that if a consumer is indi¤erent between choosing from M or N E, i.e., if W M ; = 0, he ends up choosing from M :
By Lemma 1 we know that, since the market is covered, when the monopolist designs the optimal menu he only needs to worry about ex-ante IR, ex-post U IC and ex-post V IR: As we shall see, this result greatly simpli…es the analysis.
Benchmark Cases
In this section we study two benchmark speci…cations that are particular cases of our model. First, we study the case in which the temptation probability equals zero.
That is, consumers'choices are always consistent. Second, we study the case in which the temptation probability equals one. That is, all consumers anticipate that they will always be tempted inside the store.
Time Consistent Preferences ( = 0)
Our utility representation allows for consumers to be evaluating both their ex-ante and their ex-post decisions with their commitment utility. This is the case when the temptation probability equals zero, so that our model becomes a standard horizontal di¤erentiation model. In this standard model, by selling the set of consumers'ideal products, the …rm can extract the entire surplus of each consumer type. Thus, in equilibrium, the monopolist will o¤er the menu M T C = f ; sg for all 2 [0; 1] : This is obviously a feasible menu: All IR constraints are binding while all the IC constraints are slack.
However, as the temptation probability increases, the monopolist faces the following trade-o¤s. Since the market is covered, product q v , which is to be consumed when consumers are tempted, must be desirable ex-post, satisfying ex-post V IR, but must be such that consumers also want to enter the store with their ex-ante utility function. If product q v is located closer to v , then it is the furthest away from the commitment ideal products of some of the remaining consumers, and thus prices must be lower for the ex-ante IR of these consumer types to be satis…ed. This e¤ect gives the monopolist fewer incentives to position q v at v . But then, consumer types closer to v will consume the tempting product under commitment as well, which implies that the monopolist narrows the variety of products he o¤ers when the temptation probability ( ) increases.
Time Inconsistent Preferences ( = 1)
Assume now that the probability of temptation is such that consumers, once inside the store, will purchase the tempting choice. Therefore, the monopolist only sells q v and his maximization problem becomes
Since the market is covered, the ex-ante IR constraint must be satis…ed for all ; and p v is set to extract the consumers' entire ex-post surplus. In equilibrium, the monopolist o¤ers the menu
In sum, if = 0, the monopolist o¤ers the consumers'ideal products, whereas if = 1, the monopolist o¤ers a single product.
Characterization of the Optimal Menu
In this section we compute the optimal menu of o¤ers for any . We start by deriving some auxiliary results.
Note that ex-post incentive compatibility and superadditivity of t (q; ) imply
purchasing the same product in both states (i.e., x ( ) = x v ) are located closer to the temptation preferences, v , than consumers who purchase di¤erent products in di¤erent states (i.e., x ( ) 6 = x v ). Let us denote by k the lowest consumer type who buy the same product in both states. In the following lemma we prove that the …rm optimally o¤ers the ideal commitment product for all consumer types with k .
Lemma 2 At the optimal menu q ( ) = for all 2
The intuition behind Lemma 2 is that by o¤ering the ideal commitment product for all consumer types 2 [ k ; 1], their ex-ante surplus is increased. This allows the monopolist to raise the prices of the products it o¤ers.
In equilibrium we have that
Moreover, by Lemma 2, we obtain a useful monotonicity result: For all q
The next lemma shows that the tempting choice coincides with the commitment choice of consumer k .
Lemma 3 In equilibrium,
By Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 it is obvious that, if
it is pro…table for the monopolist to increase q v (resp., decrease q v ) and increase p.
Based on the auxiliary results above, the next proposition fully characterize the optimal menu.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, the menu o¤ered by the monopolist is given by M =
Note that these results give us noteworthy features of the optimal menu. Firstly, q v is an increasing function of with q v ( = 0) = 0 and q v ( = 1) = 1 2
, which coincides with the full commitment and the full temptation benchmarks, respectively. Secondly, since by Lemma 2, q v = k , as temptation probability increases fewer consumers make di¤erent choices under di¤erent states, so product diversity decreases.
Fig. 1. Optimal Menu
Moreover, since all products sold in the store are sold at the price p and the market is covered, the …rm's pro…ts are
Thus, product prices and monopolist's pro…ts decrease with . The intuition is that since consumers are aware of their time inconsistency, a higher temptation probability has to be compensated with lower prices to attract consumers into the store, which leads to lower pro…ts for the monopolist.
Finally, the consumers'ex-ante surplus is
By Lemma 3, we know that q v = k ; thus k is the only consumer type who consumes his ideal product under both states, so it is not surprising that he gets the maximum (ex-ante) consumer surplus among all consumer types.
Fig. 2. Ex-ante consumers'surplus
Moreover, we know that a higher temptation probability implies lower product prices to attract consumer = 1 into the store (i.e., W M ; 1 = 0 needs to hold) which implies that for all 2 (0; 1) ; W M ; increases with the temptation probability.
Extensions
In this section we analyze several important extensions of our previous model. First, we extend our setting to allow for non common priors. Second, we relax the assumption that v is located at one extreme of the Hotelling line. Third, we introduce an alternative consumers' representation that allow for temptation and costly self control. Finally, we study the case of vertical di¤erentiation.
The Non-Common Priors Case
It is reasonable to think that in several situations, the …rm has better knowledge about consumers'change in tastes than consumers themselves. Like Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) , we formalize this non-common priors idea assuming that the …rm knows that temptation occurs with probability one, while consumers believe that their preferences will not change with a positive probability (1 ) (i.e., they are naive). Therefore, the monopolist now only cares about the pro…ts from the tempting choice
and uses the commitment choices to induce consumers to enter the store (this is equivalent to the hook in Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) ).
Since the monopolist only make pro…ts from the tempting choice, he wants to charge the highest p v ; therefore, in this setting we still have V (x v ) = 0 in equilibrium, thus from the V IC, it follows that
Moreover, the monopolist wants to charge the lowest possible p to induce consumers to enter the store, which is p = s t (q; v ) :
In the next lemma we show that the monopolist o¤ers just one product to be consumed under commitment.
Lemma 4 At the optimal menu M N CP
there is a single commitment choice for consumers given by x = (1; s t (1; 0)) : Consequently, k = 0.
The intuition behind Lemma 4 is that the …rm wants to locate the commitment o¤er as far from the tempting choice as possible in order to charge the highest possible price under the temptation state. This implies that in equilibrium the commitment choice is so attractive for committed consumers that all consumers 2 (0; 1] expect to choose x under commitment.
Since the monopolist wants to charge the highest possible p v , we want to check whether charging p v = s (i.e., locating q v = v = 0) is feasible. The next lemma addresses this issue and summarizes the equilibrium tempting choice.
Lemma 5 At the optimal menu M N CP ,
; and,
When consumers believe that temptation occurs with a low probability . Moreover, when = 1, we obtain the full temptation benchmark with common priors. Figure 3 shows the equilibrium choices under both types of priors.
Fig. 3. Equilibrium with Common Priors (CP) and Non-Common Priors (NCP).
Note that x is an "imaginary o¤er" (or a hook): consumers believe that they will purchase it with a positive probability, where the …rm knows that all consumers will end up purchasing x v once in the store. The monopolist uses the imaginary o¤er to attract consumers into the store and it wants to charge the lowest possible p. However, this price has a lower bound (p = s t (1; 0)) due to the incentive compatibility constraints. When consumers believe that temptation occurs with a low probabil-
the monopolist can extract all of the consumers'surplus when they are tempted, and consumers …nd it optimal to enter the store due to the bene…ts that they (incorrectly) expect to receive when committed. However, when is su¢ ciently large, the expected gains that consumer = 1 expects to obtain under commitment are lower than the expected losses that he expects to su¤er when tempted if the tempting choice is x v = (0; s). Because of this, the monopolist has to design q v suf…ciently close to = 1; otherwise, this consumer type will not derive a su¢ ciently high ex-ante utility to entice him to enter into store. 9 As in the common priors case we are assuming that s is su¢ ciently large to cover the market.
In our non-common priors case, the monopolist is o¤ering a menu which would not be accepted by some consumer types if they had the same priors as him. Therefore, the monopolist obtains higher pro…ts in the non-common priors case than in the common priors case. Moreover as with common priors, the price of the tempting choice, and hence the monopolist's pro…ts, decrease with the temptation probability.
As in the present paper, Eliaz and Spiegler study a model in which a monopolist has to design a menu for dynamically inconsistent consumers. However, it is important to point out that whereas here we consider a horizontal di¤erentiation model in which consumers di¤er in their commitment preferences, they study a model in which consumers di¤er in their prior beliefs about the future state but not in their preferences. In Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) equilibrium, sophisticated types (i.e., those with a high prior) choose a contract which perfectly commits them to their commitment choice, while naive types (i.e., those with a low prior) chose an exploitative contract, which is a contract that gives them a negative utility under temptation state in accordance with their commitment preferences. Our results con…rm that with a low there is exploitation in equilibrium (i.e., U (x v ) < 0 for all > 0). However, with our temptation model we can provide more results. If is high, the exploited consumers are those for which the di¤erence between their ideal product when committed, , and the temptation ideal product, v , is large. Moreover, the set of exploited consumers decreases as increases, because the …rm has to design the tempting choice closer to their commitment preferences.
However in this case there is an important di¤erence: when < 1 2 , the …rm wants to cover the market for any s > 0. The idea is that in this case the ex-ante IR constraint of consumer = 1 is satis…ed even when x v = (0; s) is in the menu. So the …rm can extract the entire consumers'surplus, i.e., = s.
Generalization of Temptation Preferences
In this section, we relax the assumption that consumers'temptation ideal product is a single point located at the extreme of the line. Firstly, we consider the case where the consumers'temptation ideal product is located in the interior of the interval [0; 1].
Secondly, we study the case where, ex-ante, the agents face uncertainty about the ex-post temptation ideal product. Finally, we consider the case where consumers di¤er when tempted but not when committed. . Let q v (resp., q v ) be the tempting choice of the former (resp., the later) case. Applying our previous results, we know that the tempting choice in each case is the one located closest to v and the commitment choice satis…es q ( ) = for all <q v and > q v . Therefore, in this case we have two tempting choices satisfying V (x v ) = V (x v ) = 0: Although consumers get the same utility from consuming both tempting choices, we assume that consumer types 2 0; it is possible that for a su¢ ciently large , we get a corner solution in q v = 0 or q v = 1; which implies that t q v ;
General temptation ideal product
respectively. In the following lemma we summarize this idea
, consumer = 1 has the lowest incentives to enter the store since his commitment ideal product is the farthest away from his temptation ideal product, thus in equilibrium we have W M ; 1 = 0 to ensure consumers'participation:
Moreover, we know that the tempting choices have to satisfy
Therefore, if q v > 0; in equilibrium we have two tempting choices located equidistant from v ; but, if is so high that it makes q v = 0; we have that t q v ;
Therefore, since the monopolist has to make both tempting choices equally desirable for consumers when tempted, he has to charge a lower price for q v . In particular we
is the symmetric case, the intuition would be the same.
Uncertainty about the consumers'temptation ideal product, As in the standard case, q is an increasing function of : However, note that
The idea behind this is that, when q < v , we do not just have one possible tempting choice but a continuum of possible tempting choices in the interval h q; v i . Therefore, there are possible tempting choices located closer to = 1, which gives the consumer a greater ex-ante surplus. This implies that the monopolist can design q closer to 0, which leads to higher product prices. Moreover, the greater v is the farther the location of the possible tempting choices will be. The monopolist can farther increase the product prices by lowering q:
Heterogeneity in temptation preferences
To …nish the generalization of temptation preferences'section we consider the case where consumers'di¤er in their temptation preferences. In particular we assume that the temptation ideal product is uniformly distributed on the Hotelling line (
while, when committed, all consumers have extremes preferences ( = 1). Therefore, the commitment and temptation utility functions are
An interesting result, that we prove in the following lemma, is that no matter consumers only di¤er when committed or when tempted, the optimal menu is the same, M .
Lemma 8 Let consumers' commitment ideal product be = 1 and the temptation ideal product v be uniformly distributed in [0; 1], the optimal menu is given by M =
Remember that, in the basic model, once ex-ante IR condition is satis…ed for = 1 it is satis…ed for every consumer. Moreover, by Lemma 1 this implies that, ex-post, consumers purchase a product from the menu under commitment. But the monopolist still has to assure that consumers purchases the tempting choice when tempted, i.e., ex-post V IR must be satis…ed: Therefore, the monopolist maximizes pro…ts designing a menu that gives zero ex-ante surplus for consumer = 1 W M ; 1 = 0 and zero ex-post surplus under temptation (V (x v ) = 0). In the present case we still have consumer = 1, hence in equilibrium W M ; 1 = 0 as before. However, consumers are heterogenous when tempted. It is easy = to shown that consumer v = 0 gets the lowest consumers' utility under temptation so his utility has to be zero in equilibrium. 10 Note that the consumers'commitment choice is x = (1; p ). Furthermore, products x (
under temptation. Thus, the only di¤erence with the basic model is that, instead of consuming di¤erent products when committed, consumers purchase di¤erent products under temptation while they get the same choice under commitment. But the optimal menu remains the same.
Self-Control Preferences
Previously we have considered a dual-selves representation known as the random Strotz representation. One implication of this is that consumers preferences are time inconsistent since choices ex-post are di¤erent from choices ex-ante with a positive probability . Although convenient, this representation doesn't capture the costly intrapersonal con ‡ict between di¤erent selves that consumers face when making a decision. Alternatively, Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) introduce a theory of intertemporal choices that captures temptation and self-control. This representation establishs that consumer's utility from a choice set equals the realized commitment utility minus the realized "self-control" costs, which can be interpreted as the intensity of the temptation that the individual resist by choosing a product (which is a compromise between commitment and temptation) di¤erent from the most preferred option under temptation. Thus, if b x is the realized choice from the menu M , the consumer's overall utility is given by
Note that in contrast with the random Strotz representation, Gul and Pesendorfer's approach avoid time inconsistent choices. The consumer purchases b x with probability one, and the closeness of this choice to commitment and temptation preferences as well as the self-control cost depend on the relative scale (bargaining power) between commitment and temptation preferences. Note also that under the temptation representation, that we have previously considered, there are no self-control costs in the sense of Gul and Pesendorfer, once consumer falls into temptation (with probability ) he will chose according to his temptation preferences only.
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In this section we maintain our assumptions of the basic model (Section 2) but allow for Gul and Pesendorfer preferences. Remember that in our basic model we have U (x; ) = s p t (q; ) ;
V (x) = s p t (q; 0) ;
and we de…ne Benabou and Pycia (2002) show that Gul and Pesendorfer representation can be expressed in terms of a dual-selves temptation representation. In particular, let us consider
. Thus, while in the random Strotz representation temptation probability is constant, under the Benabou and Pycia interpretation of the Gul Pesendorfer representation this probability depends on the relative intensity of consumer's preferences Note that this implies that consumers in the interval (2q v ; 1] purchase a product which is a compromise between commitment and temptation ideal points q ( ) = ; 1 cannot be o¤ered in equilibrium.
In the following lemma we show that
, so in equilibrium, all consumers purchase the same product. ; 1 :
Let us remember that in our basic model we have shown that, in equilibrium, the …rm pursues two goals: to extract the entire consumers surplus under temptation (V (x v ) = 0) and to ensure participation of the consumer with the highest dynamic inconsistency problem W M ; 1 = 0 . If temptation probability is low the …rm can achieve both goals with a tempting choice close to the temptation preferences which implies that high prices are feasible. However, as temptation probability increases the …rm has to locate the tempting choice closer to the commitment preferences of = 1 which also implies that prices must decrease. Under the Gul and Pesendorfer representation every consumer, in particular = 1, su¤er the self-control costs with probability one. So in order to charge the highest possible prices consistent with market coverage the …rm has to minimize self-control costs. 
Vertical Di¤erentiation
The last extension we consider is the case of vertical di¤erentiation. Thus, we study a model where consumers agree on the quality ranking of the products. This is an interesting extension of our basic model with horizontal di¤erentiation where consumers di¤er on their ideal products in the menu. The purpose of this section is to emphasize the role that horizontal di¤erentiation plays in our model. Moreover, by studying the vertical di¤erentiation we can compare our model with the related paper of Esteban et al. (2006) .
According to the standard vertical di¤erentiation model we consider the following utility functions:
with v 0 (q) > 0 and v 00 (q) < 0. By simplicity we assume that v (q) = q with < 1.
As in our basic model we assume that consumers di¤er when committed (
while they have the same preferences when tempted. To make an accurate compar-
ison with my basic model we assume that = 1 under temptation. Thus, under the temptation state all consumers have the highest marginal valuation for quality.
Therefore, the ex-ante surplus of consumer is given by
Moreover, we assume that the monopolist marginal cost of production is given by c 2 R + :
Time consistent preferences
We start analyzing the case where temptation probability equals cero. In this case the model becomes the standard vertical di¤erentiation model. The monopolist problem is given by
We can solve this problem applying standard techniques (see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) , page 86), so we get
Therefore, all consumers with 1 2
purchase product with quality q V C ( ) while all consumers with < 1 2
do not purchase any product.
Time inconsistent preferences
To see what is the e¤ect of temptation in the vertical di¤erentiation model we study now the case where consumers'temptation equals one. Therefore, the monopolist only sells one product M V I = fq; pg. 12 Let us de…ne such that U (x; ) = 0.
Therefore, once ex-ante IR of consumer holds, it holds for all consumers with .
Moreover, it is also immediate that consumers with 2 [ ; 1] purchase the product from M V I . In other words, ex-ante IR implies ex-post IR as in the horizontal di¤er-entiation model. Therefore, the monopolist maximization problem is given by
The solution of this problem is
Note that = 1 2
(1 + ) > the production cost is su¢ ciently high the …rm o¤ers a product with a quality that is at least as high as the highest quality o¤ered in the time consistent preferences case.
12 Similar results can be obtained with a model of a general temptation probability 2 (0; 1) but, in this case, the …rm would o¤er a continuum of products.
The intuition is the following: In contrast to the horizontal di¤erentiation model, the dynamic inconsistency of preferences is not costly for consumers unless they have to pay a higher price for the product. As we have shown, the quality or the price of the product will be higher or lower than the one in the time consistent preferences case depending on the production costs. In particular, when c is high enough, the quality of the product sold in the time inconsistent preferences case is higher than the one in the standard time consistent preferences case simply because less consumers are served (so production costs are lower) and these consumers have a high quality valuation. This is an important di¤erence with the horizontal di¤erentiation model where consumers ideal products change once in the store so the …rm has to design a product that is a compromise between (ex-ante) commitment preferences and (ex-post) temptation preferences. Another important di¤erence has to be with welfare. Remember that in the horizontal di¤erentiation model all consumers are at least as well o¤ with time inconsistency as with time consistency while the …rm is always worse o¤. However, it is immediate that in the vertical di¤erentiation model some consumers are worse o¤ with time inconsistency (for instance, gets cero surplus under time inconsistency while he gets positive informational rents under time consistency) and the …rm can be better o¤ because he has not to pay "informational rents".
To …nish this section, we want to point out the di¤erences between our model and the other paper that study the optimal menu o¤ered by a monopolist when consumers su¤er from temptation. As we have pointed out in the introduction, Esteban et al. welfare is ambiguous: there is a positive e¤ect due to lower prices but a negative e¤ect as well because of costly self-control which can reduce the informational rents that consumers get in the standard case. More importantly, results can be very di¤erent when we compare models with the same representation of consumers preferences. In the previous section we have shown that a horizontal di¤erentiation model with Gul and Pesendorfer preferences yields, in equilibrium, a singleton menu which eliminates self control costs. Only when we consider a representation with time inconsistent preferences we obtain a menu which includes more products; in particular a product to be consumed by all of them under temptation. Finally, a vertical di¤erentiation model with time inconsistent preferences may yield slightly di¤erent results. When temptation occurs with probability one, the …rm also o¤ers a singleton menu but, as we have seen in this section, welfare results are di¤erent.
Conclusion
We have considered a model in which consumers face problems of temptation and selfcontrol, where temptation is modelled as a change of the consumers'ideal product in the Hotelling segment. We have studied the optimal menu designed by a monopolist.
In our basic model, consumers are perfectly aware of their dynamic inconsistency and all consumers have the same temptation preferences. In this case, the optimal menu is di¤erent than the one in a standard horizontal di¤erentiation model in the following sense. In equilibrium, the monopolist truncates the set of products o¤ered, not o¤ering the products closest to the consumers'temptation ideal product. As a result the number of products o¤ered decreases with the temptation probability.
We have studied several extensions of the basic model. First, we have studied the case in which consumers are only partially aware of their dynamic inconsistency. In particular, we have studied the case in which the monopolist knows that consumers will be tempted but consumers, instead, believe incorrectly that they will be tempted with probability . We have shown that, if is su¢ ciently low, the monopolist o¤ers as many products as consumer types there are, but if is su¢ ciently high, the …rm does not o¤er the products closest to the consumers'ideal products. second, we have studied more general speci…cations of the temptation preferences and have shown that our main results remain true. Third, we have studied a di¤erent temptation representation that avoids time inconsistency. Finally, we have compared our results with those obtained in a vertical di¤erentiation model.
APPENDIX Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas

Proof of Lemma 2
We show that a gap with no products in ; [ k ; 1] ; can be improved upon by designing a product with b q 2 ; : Let p be the price of the product and p be the price of product . Assume with no loss of generality that consumer b 2 ; buys product . Then product b
is feasible and yields more pro…ts. Thus, repeating this argument, we get that, in equilibrium, q ( ) = for all 2 ; : 
Proof of Lemma 3
We show that, if q v < k ; the monopolist …nds it optimal to decrease k : By de…nition of k , U (x ( k ) ; k ) = U (x v ; k ) : Thus, using Lemma 2, p v = p t (q v ; k ).
Therefore, the monopolist's pro…ts are 
Proof of Proposition 1
Immediate from Lemmas 1-3. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4
Suppose by contradiction that the monopolist designs commitment products in the interval [ ; 1], where 2 [0; 1) : Then, for any commitment product, the price is p = s t ( ; 0) ; which is unique by the incentive compatibility constraints: Therefore, the ex-ante surplus of consumers with k , is given by
(1 ) s p t ( ; ) + (t (q v ; v ) t (q v ; )) for all < ;
(1 ) s p + (t (q v ; v ) t (q v ; )) for all :
< 0, for all > q v ; the "worst consumer type" from the point of view of the monopolist is = 1. Note that by setting = 1 the monopolist maximizes W M ; 1 and thus allows for the lowest q v which yields the highest price for the tempting product and hence the highest pro…ts.
Finally, note that since = 1, p = s t (1; 0), moreover since V (x v ) = 0, p v = s t (q v ; 0) : Therefore from the de…nition of k , U (x ( k ) ; k ) = U (x v ; k ) we get that k = 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5
Since the monopolist wants to charge the highest possible p v ; we need to check that p v = s (i.e., locating q v = v = 0) is feasible. In our case, it is su¢ cient to check Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6
It su¢ ces to show (i) since (ii) is symmetric. If q v > 0, the result is trivial. 
Proof of Lemma 7
Note that, in this case, Lemma 1 as well as results of Section 4 (Lemma 2 and Lemma 3) are still valid if we substitute q v by q: Thus, the optimal menu is M = ( ; p ) for all 2 q; 1 . Moreover, as we show in Section 4, we have W M ; 0 = W M ; 1 = 0 in equilibrium: If q > v , there is just one tempting choice, i.e., q v = q. Therefore, using the previous condition s p t q; 0 = (1 ) (s p ) + s p t q; 1 = 0; so that t q; 0 = t q; 1 :
However, if q < v , every product in h q; Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 8
First of all note that Lemma 1 remains true when v is uniformly distributed in 
